Robin, this is going to be so enthralling to see come together.... It is a build I am going to be following with a great deal of anticipation. Judging by the skills you have shown to date I believe this is going to be something special..... The very best of luck with this one..... .

As for the book, I think I have enough reference material for now except for some detailed pics or drawings of the Thermotanks located on the aft well deck..... going to keep hunting though..... Thanks again....

Regards

Alan

Thanks for those kind wishes Alan and Stevie! This is going to be a long and complicated build. The base itself is beginning to take shape now and is still evolving despite all the planning! I had a brainwave a few days ago (which surprised even me at it's simplicity!) but the change will make the detailing far easier to accomplish which is great!

Oh, nearly forgot Stevie, Emhar do a very nice range of British tanks of WW1 from the little Whippet up to the massive Tadpole, why not do one of them in a single vehicle diorama! That would be a great diary to follow.

You should begin to see the project 'on screen' so to speak, from the end of next week, until then here's the history bit!


Happy Building to all.

Robin

“Kaiser Bill is feeling ill,
The Crown Prince, he’s gone barmy!
And we don’t give a XXXX,
For Old Von Kluck,
And all his bleedin’ Army!”
Marching song of the ‘Old Contemptables’ to the tune of ‘The Girl I left behind me’

Part One: Preparations for the Battle.

It is June 1917, many of the professional soldiers of the British Army who sang their defiant songs in 1914 are gone, as are the Germans they first encountered, sacrificed in the insanity of the trenches where hundreds of thousands on both sides are scythed down in suicidal charges across the killing grounds of No-Man’s Land, the war has degenerated into carnage with bayonets and cavalry swords facing relentless artillery and the obscenity of poison gas.
The French led Nivelle Offensive of April and May failed to achieve any major breakthroughs and caused a general demoralisation of the French Army. It was now agreed that the British would plan and implement a fresh Offensive in the Belgian West Flanders area, which would draw the German reserves away from the French sector, relieving the French armies which were rapidly cracking under the relentless pressure.
It was decided therefore that the British Second Army, commanded by General Herbert Plumer would launch an assault against the high ground to their east occupied by the Germans in a strong defensive line along the Messines Ridge. The attack would take place from Ploegsteert Wood in the south (called Plugstreet by the Tommies) through Messines itself to Mt. Sorrel in the north, this whole area lay between the British lines to the west and Passchendaele Ridge to the north east, the real objective of a further assault beyond Messines which would allow the Allies to capture the entire Belgian coast up to the Dutch frontier.
General Plumer was, to look at, the spitting image of a Colonel Blimp! Chubby cheeked with a great bushy white moustache, but there the similarity ended. Popular with his men, he was not a favourite of Haig who thought about removing him on various occasions. Unlike many of the armchair warriors leading the British Army from miles in the rear, Plumer was a meticulous planner who went into every detail of an operation, accounting for everything and leaving nothing to chance. In actual fact I would regard General Plumer as a ‘Local Boy’, as he was born just up the coast from me at Torquay in 1857.
The Second Army consisted of five Corps, with twelve Divisions, totalling about 216,000 men, incorporating regiments and brigades from Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. They would initially face the five Divisions of the German XIX Corps commanded by Crown Prince Rupprecht and General Sixt von Arnim. Although this seems like a huge advantage in numbers for the British, only three of the five Corps would actually be involved in the assault, the other two remained on the northern flank to prevent a counter attack by the Germans from cutting through the thinned Allied rear from the north.
The attack had been planned since 1916 and theoretically, had actually been underway since then as the British conducted a huge mining offensive, secretly driving long underground shafts from behind the front lines, under no-man’s land to finally excavate large chambers beneath the German trenches. Twenty one mines were dug although only nineteen would be detonated on the day, of the other two, one failed to detonate for some unknown reason, and the final mine was abandoned due to German counter mining operations although it was already packed with several thousand pounds of explosive before it was abandoned. A new high explosive called Ammonal was used which was rendered unusable when wet so it was packed into rubber sealed tins and boxes before being transported to the mines by mules led along specially deepened trenches to protect them from enemy observation. Four hundred and forty seven tons of ammonal were packed into the twenty three mines during the weeks before the attack was planned to start. The mines were dug by experienced miners who formed a special battalion, and were paid six times what the front line soldiers received. They were a special breed, known as ‘Clay Kickers’, the shafts were dug, not with picks and shovels, the sound of which would have alerted the German listening posts but with a special tool which the miner forced silently into the soft London Clay with his feet whilst laying back on a purpose built wooden frame. This was a very dangerous game of cat and mouse with the German counter miners (hence the high pay). If the enemy detected the digging they would dig their own shaft under the British one, pack it with explosives and detonate it below the defenceless men, if the British detected the Germans doing that, they would sink a deeper shaft below the German miners and do the same to them! In fact the British tunnelers dug sacrificial shafts above the main tunnels to distract the Germans from the real objectives, the ‘Horrible Hun’ were allowed to blow up the empty upper tunnels thinking they had killed the miners who then carried on silently ‘Kicking the Clay’ deeper down.
Of the twenty one mines, only one was actually compromised by enemy action and that was after it had been filled up with the high explosive ready for the offensive. The bodies of two British miners are still entombed in that tunnel to this day, as are the tons of high explosive, which were never detonated.
As the date for the attack drew near, large numbers of heavy machine gun posts were constructed along the front line, these would not be advancing with the first wave but would provide an ‘overhead barrage’ of plunging fire onto what remained of the German trenches as the British and Colonials advanced through No-Man’s Land. As further examples of Plumer’s detailed planning, three Field Companies of Engineers were kept back in reserve, their job was to repair the blasted roads and set up defensive positions as the troops advanced. Artillery support from 4.5”, 6” and 8” Howitzers would land on all German positions within 1500 yards of the advance, ceasing fire only when the British infantry got within 300 yards when the closer 18 pounder Field Guns would open up on the next line of trenches. Where the opposing trenches were too close for artillery support, the troops own Trench Mortars would provide the initial barrage. As the attack would be going in under cover of darkness after the mines were exploded, an observation balloon was reserved to relay messages sent back by signal lamp from the front lines as insurance against telephone lines being cut and runners not getting through. The artillery support was commanded by Major General G. McK. Franks, and great care was taken to identify every possible German artillery position and to accurately target those positions to suppress the inevitable German counter barrage. The Second Army Report Centre which co-ordinated all the artillery fire at Locre Chateau, was linked to all the various observation points; Corps Report Centres, Corps Artillery HQs, Balloon, Wireless and Observation stations by a deeply buried telephone cable and staffed by a dedicated Counter Battery Staff Officer who held daily evening conferences to collate the day’s Intelligence reports. One particularly brilliant young Officer had even devised a sonic detection network using a variety of odds and ends including empty rum ration jars and electrical wires. These ‘listening’ posts could detect the initial ground tremors whenever a German battery opened fire (before the shells arrived of course) and by recording the exact time of the disturbance and the strength of the tremor and passing this information back to the young Officer, by means of incredibly complex formulae and mathematics, he could pinpoint the enemy battery to within a few yards. This enabled the British to counter fire and destroy the German guns even in thick fog or mist. The entire 17,000 yard front line of the offensive was divided up into squares on the maps and individual batteries assigned to particular squares, all at instant readiness to open fire on any target within them.
British aircraft prevented the Germans from observing the changing front line by dominating the sky from the front to the German balloon lines some 10,000 yards to the rear. Better fighters like the Bristol F2, the SE5A and the Sopwith Triplane matched the best the Germans had and in fact Plumer had managed to secure more aircraft for his assault sector than the Germans had for the whole Western Front. No British aircraft were shot down until the actual day of the attack. The British even developed a wireless detection system, obtaining bearings on the few German observation aircraft that were sent up and used it to great effect, guiding British fighters to intercept them! Finally, in a ruse which pre-dated the famous D-Day Deceptions, the radio traffic was increased at other points along the front lines, non existent units talking to one another day and night, all of course being intercepted by the German listening posts behind the lines.

Part Three to follow: The Battle Begins

Thanks again Alan and to all those who have been having a look! here's the last of the history section, then the hard work starts!

Part Four: The Final Objective, the Oosttaverne Line.

Originally, the plan called for a pause of five hours before the third and final assault was begun. This was increased by a further two hours when General Plumer received reports on the condition of the ground, another two hours of June sunshine would help both the infantry and the tanks over the results of the previous night’s thunderstorm. The hidden British artillery positions were bolstered up by new batteries and lighter guns were moved as far into the old No Man’s Land as they could reach.
On the west side of the newly captured ridge, 146 heavy machine guns were set up to fire an overhead barrage whilst each battalion digging in to their new positions on the eastern side employed an additional 16 ‘heavies’ for direct fire support. 24 MkIV’s from the reserve had begun to advance from 10.30am to join the II Anzacs and they were to be joined by any surviving tanks from the morning attack.
Unfortunately for the 4th Australian Division, they reached the assembly areas for the third wave at the original jump off time, the postponement having not reached them and they were forced to spend those two hours on open ground under German artillery and machine gun fire which caused considerable casualties. The left hand brigade was warned in time however and did not advance until 1.40pm.
At 3.10pm the British artillery began its creeping barrage down the eastern slopes at the rate of a hundred yards every three minutes. The troops advanced on a two thousand yard front behind the barrage eventually meeting stiff resistance from the pillboxes set into the third line. These defenders caused many casualties until the three supporting tanks arrived behind the infantry and blew the strong points apart with their HE shells and machine gun fire. As the infantry fanned out behind the destroyed positions the surviving Germans were observed fleeing through the British bombardment which had now stopped creeping forward and was targeted on a position three hundred yards beyond the final line of trenches. The assault, like the morning attack, went pretty much to plan although the delays in some battalions reaching their starting points whilst others had gone earlier than intended, resulted in some link ups between the Brigades taking place up to a thousand yards distant from their intended points on the map as the earlier battalions veered off course looking for their left or right flank comrades. The Aussis for instance advanced an extra thousand yards to the north looking for the 33rd Brigade, which finally turned up at 4.30pm with four tanks in tow (not literally!). When they did eventually link up the two groups promptly took Joye and Van Hove Farms for good measure, the tanks silencing the machine guns firing out from both of them.
Further north, the British formations also met some resistance but were able to keep up with the barrage capturing many farms and undefended pillboxes. In the process they also captured 289 Germans along with six field guns for the incredibly light loss of six casualties. Advancing another eight hundred yards they then took Ravine Wood on the left flank (unopposed). The left flank battalion was then pulled back to aid the 47th Division which was encountering heavy machine gun fire from a line of spoil tips ahead.
This was the high point of the Messines Ridge Assault with every objective apart from those spoil tips and about a thousand yard stretch of the extreme rear of the third line between the Anzacs and IX Corps where delays in the link ups had allowed the Germans to bring up reinforcements. The same thing happened at the spoil tips and a later infantry attack met heavy machine gun fire, losing a third of their number before withdrawing. A German counter attack was seen massing near the 12th Australian Brigade who called back for an ‘SOS’ barrage. This was duly delivered but tragically fell not on the Germans but on the Aussis who had inadvertently dug in 250 yards beyond its objective, right on the spot in fact that they had called the artillery fire down on. The untouched German attack, when it came, was successfully repulsed by the surviving Australians with small arms fire alone. After the enemy had retreated however, many of the Aussis decided to do likewise and pulled back to the relative safety of the ridge. At dusk, and under the impression that all of the Australians had pulled back, and fearing another German build up, the New Zealand artillery observers called for a second barrage of the same area which fell on to those Anzacs who had held their positions. Those brave soldiers then did fall back, unfortunately with many casualties leaving the southern part of the third line unoccupied. ‘Panic barrages’ continued into the night, some of them also landing on friendly positions until the infantry managed to get all artillery stopped from 10pm after which many of the abandoned enemy trenches were re-taken before dawn.
Throughout the entire assault, the British air force provided overhead reconnaissance. This proved a great help where the troops on the ground were experienced. In those areas the troops lit flares and waved anything they could get hold of to signal their location. As the attack progressed the pilots and observers would note these positions onto copies of their sector maps and when their relief aircraft arrived, they flew back to the Divisional HQs and dropped the maps for continual updates to the High Command. It did not work so well where inexperienced and poorly trained units were concerned. Quite sensibly not wanting to expose themselves in the middle of a shooting match, these units refused to identify themselves to the circling planes, forcing them to fly very low to obtain a positive identification and resulting in four of them being shot down by enemy fire. Apparently, with such a superiority in the numbers of British aircraft, the German infantry were just as disinclined to reveal themselves to their own observation aircraft too, forcing them into low passes as well.
Two of the fourteen British fighters were shot down by ground fire but their contribution to the battle in strafing infantry, transport, gun crews and machine gun nests were out of all proportion to their numbers and losses. During the entire day’s battle, only one British aircraft was lost to a German fighter.

The Aftermath:

As usual with any battle, military analysts and later, historians, disagreed on the significance of Messines. Although generally described as a “British tactical success” it was not regarded as a magnificent breakthrough which would ‘end the war by Christmas’. General Plumer would probably have regarded those who claimed that view as complete idiots – he had never intended that the assault on Messines should be a complete breakthrough! That was one of the main reasons why Haig had nearly had him removed on several occasions, where Haig was always convinced by the ‘one more push’ planners (it later transpired that his own intelligence staff repeatedly gave him ‘doctored’ information on the state of the German army, for what reason, only they can ever know) and he was continually expecting the enemy morale to collapse which is why he ordered some attacks in places and at times that they were doomed to failure. Far from the “Butcher Haig” tag that he received during and after the Great War, he was very concerned with reducing his own casualties which was why he was such a great supporter of the first tank developments. General Plumer on the other hand never believed in the ‘final push’ doctrine, to him, every assault he planned was designed to simply take the desired objectives as quickly as possible with as few losses as he could take them with. His was a war of ‘chipping away’ at the enemy lines, not punching straight through them and damn the casualties and in this respect, Messines was a good 95% successful. His thorough planning and preparation resulted in far less casualties than earlier ‘over the tops’, in usual conditions the losses on the attacking side would be expected to be at least three times those of the defenders, at Messines the losses on both sides were almost identical at around 25,000. The Germans lost most of their dead in the initial mine explosions, about 10,000 killed in nineteen seconds! The British and Commonwealth troops lost most of theirs not in the attack itself, but in the days before and after, defending the former front line and the newly captured positions from German counter attacks and artillery.
If there was one tactic which secured the victory and reduced casualties (probably on both sides) it was the use of the MkIV Heavy Tank. Where ever the infantry was held up by determined resistance from surviving bunkers and pillboxes, a tank would come crawling out of the smoke and gloom. The defenders once engaged would either be blasted out or, in many cases simply surrendered, saving both their own lives and those of the attackers who might have otherwise been cut down storming the position in the ‘good old way’. In this respect, the tanks had suffered an unexpected stroke of good luck, much to the consternation of not just the German infantry and High Command but to various members of the British High Command who, by various means had tried to destroy the whole concept of the armoured fighting vehicle.
The designers and builders of the very first fighting tanks the MkI had come up with not only the concept of the vehicle itself but also how it was supposed to be used in battle. That concept in all but name (and speed) was Blitzkreig! The first tanks were supposed to be kept a total secret until a) they had built at least a thousand of them, b) the problems with the early gearboxes had been rectified and c) a battleground suited to their performance could be found. In essence, the very first time that British tanks appeared on the battlefield, they would swamp the enemy, completely demoralising him and gaining the almost mythical ‘break through’. To the complete horror of the designers, everything they had planned for was disregarded, by Haig, again mislead by deliberately incorrect intelligence and also by many in his staff who wanted nothing more than to see this new ‘ungentlemanly’ weapon of war melted back down into more artillery pieces which they regarded as far more useful!
The first appearance of the tank therefore was in the battle of Flers during the Somme offensives, an area so soft and muddy that the tank corp pleaded not to send them there! Nevertheless, every tank then built was grabbed by the army and rushed to France, an attack which the tank’s designers had envisaged beginning with a thousand machines was hijacked by the top brass and conducted with 49! Not only were there a mere 49 tanks to begin with, the army had also grabbed all the special training tanks from the mechanised warfare school (included in that 49!). These vehicles were never designed for combat, although they were armed (for training the crews on the 6pdr QF cannons, they were not fitted with armour plating at all, all they had as their outer skin was un-hardened boiler plate. As the ‘49’ began to move up to the front lines, 17 broke down before even reaching them and of the 22 tanks that did arrive at the front, another 7 broke down at zero hour which left a grand total of 15 tanks to scream across the battlefield at half a mile an hour.
When the attack began the effect on the Germans was all out of proportion to their numbers, those tanks that didn’t sink almost out of sight in the deep mud instilled such a sense of hopelessness in the enemy infantry that, just as at Messines and other battles later in the war, they surrendered in droves. By the end of the battle however, most of the tanks engaged had either been knocked out by artillery or had ditched themselves and been captured. This however, was the German’s biggest mistake because most of the ones they captured were in fact the training machines. The tank crews hadn’t stood a chance (just as those who sent them into battle well knew), they had been riddled by the standard German armour piercing bullet the ‘K’ round. Further tests against the captured tanks proved that the K round was quite sufficient to stop the new British terror weapon in its tracks (literally!). If they had bothered to try, they would probably have found that even a 9mm Luger round would have gone through the armour too! The German opinion therefore was that the tank could be stopped by their existing ammunition, there was no need to develop better rounds and no point in developing their own tank to fight against the British.
When the MkIVs attacked at Messines Ridge, the German machine gunners fired off entire belts of K rounds only to watch with mounting horror as everyone of them bounced harmlessly off the MkIV’s even thicker hardened armour, merely alerting the tank to the gunners location.
Perhaps the best way to answer the question of how successful Messines was would be to ask the enemy! Ludendorff later wrote "the British victory cost the German army dear and drained the German reserves" and Von Kuhl called it "One of the worst German tragedies of the war"
The result of Messines therefore, was a complete vindication of General Plumer’s planning and intention. Messines was itself only the preliminary phase of the next battle which would take place to the north of the ridge and which could not have been executed without the high ground of Messines being in ‘Entente’ hands. In that battle however, the ground would once again be a boggy mud and water filled hell, totally unfit for the tanks to operate in. The slaughter that would take place on the plains to the north of Messines would become another by-word for carnage – Passchendaele!

The Mines, their weight of high explosive and the resultant craters.
Hill 60A 53,500lbs 191ft
Hill 60B 70,000lbs 260ft
St. Eloi 95,600lbs 176ft
Hollandscheschour 1 34,200lbs 183ft
Hollandscheschour 2 14,900lbs 105ft
Hollandscheschour 3 17,500lbs 141ft
Petit Bois 1 30,000lbs 175ft
Petit Bois 2 30,000lbs 217ft
Maedelstede Farm 94,000lbs 217ft
Peckham 87,000lbs 240ft
Spanbroekmolen 91,000lbs 250ft
Kruisstraat 1 30,000lbs 235ft
Kruisstraat 4 19,500lbs (same crater as 1)
Kruisstraat 3 30,000lbs 202ft
Ontario Farm 60,000lbs 200ft
Trench 127 Left 36,000lbs 182ft
Trench 127 Right 50,000lbs 210ft
Trench 122 Left 20,000lbs 195ft
Trench 122 Right 40,000lbs 228ft

Casualties: British and Commonwealth: 24,562 German: 25,000 Civilians: 1 cow*

Of the two mines which were not detonated, one still lies under Petit Douve Farm (just beyond the area of the diorama) due to its discovery and German counter mining. The other did not explode for unknown reasons. On the 17th July 1955, the field under which the mine lay was struck during a lightning storm, the resulting explosion killed a single cow!


So here ends the history lesson and the story of my chosen diorama the Messines Ridge. I hope you can get some idea of the horrors that were faced by the soldiers of both sides which I hope to do justice to as the build takes off. The first postings for the build should begin towards the end of this week, (I’ve done some early bits and got the photos, just got to write it up for the diary now!)

Before I go I’d just like to acknowledge the following as the source of the info and photos I’ve used in the history section. Many of the pictures I’ve noticed appear multiple times on many different sites so, as they say, “other sources are available” but these are the ones where I first came across the photos I wanted to illustrate the text so, my grateful thanks to them all!

Most of the history was gleaned from the excellent Wikipedia “Battle of Messines (1917) pages, together with some of the photos, the rest were as follows:

The Worcester Regiment Messines website
The 36th Ulster Division Messines website
www.worldwar1.com
Bain News Service Publisher website
www.firstworldwar.com
AWM London website (Australian War Memorial London)
People and Places website (Mike St. Maur Sheil)
www.ww1battlefields.co.uk

In Part Five: The Initial Design and the Base work begins.


Robin

Hi Robin, very interesting start you have made and think the layout you have described is going to be packed full of detail.... Cracking idea too on cutting one of the tanks in two and showing the internal details. This will add a lot for the viewer to ogle at no matter from which angle they view the layout from...... .. Will be following with serious interest....

Regards

Alan